



Impact of Institutional Environment Quality on Tax Evasion: A 
Comparative Investigation of Old Versus New EU Members
Yamen, A., Allam, A., Bani-Mustafa, A. and Uyar, A.
 
NOTICE: this is the authors’ version of a work that was accepted for publication in 
Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation. Changes resulting from the 
publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and 
other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may 
have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version 
was subsequently published in Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and 
Taxation.
The final definitive version in Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation 
is available online at:
https://www.sciencedirect.com/journal/journal-of-international-accou...
© 2018. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
The WestminsterResearch online digital archive at the University of Westminster aims to make the 
research output of the University available to a wider audience. Copyright and Moral Rights remain 
with the authors and/or copyright owners.
Whilst further distribution of specific materials from within this archive is forbidden, you may freely 
distribute the URL of WestminsterResearch: ((http://westminsterresearch.wmin.ac.uk/).
In case of abuse or copyright appearing without permission e-mail repository@westminster.ac.uk

Impact of Institutional Environment Quality on Tax 
Evasion: A Comparative Investigation of Old Versus New 
EU Members
Abstract
This paper aims at comparatively investigating the impact of institutional environment 
quality (IEQ) on tax evasion in old (pre-2004) and new (post-2004) European Union 
(EU) member states. IEQ is measured by the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance 
Indicators, which include voice and accountability, political stability, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. The size of 
shadow economy is used as a proxy for tax evasion. Using a linear mixed model to 
analyse the data, the results indicate a higher level of tax evasion in new member states 
compared to the old ones and reveal that tax evasion is decreasing in the old, albeit at a 
lower rate compared to the new EU members. Overall, there is evidence that the impact 
of IEQ on tax evasion is different between the two groups. While regulatory quality, 
voice and accountability, control of corruption, political stability and government 
effectiveness are significant determinants of tax evasion levels in older EU members, 
government effectiveness is the only significant factor in the new EU member states. 
Keywords: Tax evasion, Worldwide Governance Indicators, Institutional environment 
quality, EU, Linear mixed model
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1 Introduction
The tax evasion phenomenon has been investigated in several studies at the national, 
corporate and individual levels, aiming at understanding its determinants and economic 
implications. The examination of tax evasion at the national level, the focus of this 
study, has historically focused on economic factors with fewer studies paying attention 
to non-economic factors. This is regardless of the assertion that “tax compliance seems 
to depend upon numerous factors beyond the standard economic ones” (Alm & Torgler, 
2006, p. 225).
A number of studies have highlighted the importance of non-economic variables in tax 
evasion studies. For example, Riahi-Belkaoui (2004, p. 141) calls for “the need for a 
contingency theory of tax compliance that calls on not only economic determinants of 
tax compliance but also institutional and moral determinants.” Building on Riahi-
Belkaoui’s (2004) study, Richardson (2006, p. 150) examined the determinants of tax 
evasion in 45 countries and concluded that “non-economic determinants have the 
strongest impact on tax evasion” compared to economic variables. Furthermore, 
Richardson (2008) found evidence that adding non-economic variables to tax evasion 
models increase their explanatory power.
Accordingly, this study investigates the impact of governance indicators, as a set of 
non-economic, institutional environment quality (IEQ) measures, on tax evasion in an 
attempt to understand the role of IEQ in explaining tax evasion levels. This is achieved 
by examining the relationship between the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGIs) and tax evasion at country-level. These indicators include voice and 
accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of 
law, and control of corruption. Using a linear mixed model, this study comparatively 
examines tax evasion levels in old (pre-2004) and new (post-2004) EU member states 
(hereafter referred to as EU1 and EU2, respectively) over the period 2004-2014. During 
this period, the EU witnessed its biggest enlargement wave, with the accession of 10 
countries in 2004, for the union to reach 27 countries, encompassing several East 
European countries. In other words, ‘old EU member states’ includes those countries 
that established or joined the EU before 2004, whereas ‘new EU member states’ refers 
to those countries that joined the EU in 2004 or later. It is contested here that tax evasion 
levels are likely to be different between EU1 and EU2 and that the difference could be 
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explained by the variation in IEQ. This could potentially inform policy makers when 
setting unified regulations and directives across the union.
Tax evasion in the EU was estimated at €860 billion annually (Murphy, 2011). The 
case of Greece is perhaps the worst in the EU, as tax evasion is estimated to be equal 
to one-third of its total tax revenues; a figure that is almost equal to its budget deficit 
(Beck, Lin, & Ma, 2014). However, globally, it is claimed that the “actual [level of] 
evasion is unknown and impossible to determine” (Tsakumis, Curatola, & Porcano, 
2007, p. 140). The Panama papers leak, widely reported in April 2016, highlighted the 
involvement of not only business people but also politicians and world leaders in using 
offshore financial centres as tax havens.1 This leak resulted in a number of 
investigations worldwide and led to the resignation of the Prime Minister of Iceland, a 
highly vocal opponent of tax evasion.
The rationale for investigating the tax evasion phenomenon in the EU context is related 
to its economic strength, composition, and the recent threats to its unity. Considered as 
one bloc, the EU is the second largest economy in the world with a GDP of €16.5 trillion 
in 2016 (International Monetary Fund, 2017). The unity of the EU has been under 
threat, especially after the 2008 financial crisis, as its economic consequences had 
reflected negatively on the member states at different levels with a number of southern 
European countries suffering the most, such as Greece, Italy and Spain.
Although countries must meet a number of conditions (Copenhagen Criteria)2 before 
joining the union, it can be argued that they are not completely similar, albeit with less 
differences among the member states compared to other studies that examined tax 
evasion in countries with no common backgrounds. The investigation in such a 
comparative context should fine-tune our understanding of how IEQ influences TE. 
Highlighting the differences between the two groups could provide policymakers with 
guidance on how to minimise the impact of these differences through the 
operationalisation of specific institutional environment factors.
1 The Panama Papers were published in April 2016 by The International Consortium of Investigative 
Journalists (ICIJ, 2016). 
2 “The criteria require that a state has the institutions to preserve democratic governance and human 
rights, has a functioning market economy, and accepts the obligations and intent of the EU.” (Source: 
European Commission website www.ec.europa.eu)
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In addition, differences in standards of living across the union have led to an 
immigration movement from eastern to western countries; a factor that played a 
significant role during the political debates leading to the 2017 UK referendum that 
resulted in a simple majority vote to leave the EU (known as Brexit). A few years 
earlier, economic pressures emanating from the government-debt crisis in Greece had 
put the country under pressure to leave the EU (or Grexit). As the standards of living, 
social welfare, and government-debt are linked to tax evasion, studying the 
phenomenon in the EU, comparing its levels in old versus new members, appears to be 
a suitable context to examine the impact of IEQ on tax evasion. Based on the above 
discussion, the study attempts to answer the following three research questions:
• Is there a difference in the level of tax evasion between old (pre-2004) and 
new (post-2004) EU member states?
• What is impact of institutional environment quality on the level of tax evasion 
in the EU?
• How did tax evasion behaviour in the EU change over the period 2004-2014?
After controlling for social and economic differences among the EU member states, the 
results indicate a higher level of tax evasion in EU2 compared to EU1 member states. 
However, tax evasion was declining over time at a slower pace in EU1 member states. 
With regard to IEQ, the results reveal that five of the six WGIs in EU1 (regulatory 
quality, voice and accountability, control of corruption, political stability and 
government effectiveness) have an impact on tax evasion. This is compared to only one 
indicator, government effectiveness, in EU2.
The study contributes to the literature on tax evasion in a number of ways. It responds 
to the calls made by different scholars on the role of non-economic variables on tax 
evasion. An understanding of the relationship between IEQ and tax evasion could prove 
effective in controlling tax evasion in the long term. Torgler and Schneider (2009) 
investigated the IEQ’s impact on shadow economies on a sample of 55 countries during 
the period between 1990 and 1999. They concluded that IEQ is “relevant in explaining 
the size of shadow economy” (2009, p. 236). This study adopts a similar approach but 
focusing exclusively on EU member states and utilises a more informative statistical 
analysis, as discussed in section 4.3. In addition, this is the first study, to the best of our 
knowledge, that examines tax evasion in the EU in a comparative context in an attempt 
to highlight the impact of IEQ difference on tax evasion levels.
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The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The next section provides a review 
of the literature on tax evasion. This is followed by hypotheses development in the third 
section. The fourth section presents the research design and methodology employed in 
the study, followed by a presentation of the results in the fifth section. Finally, the paper 
is concluded with a discussion of the findings, including guidance for policy makers, 
the limitations, and future research.
2 Tax evasion: a background
Several attempts have been made to define tax evasion. For example, Korndörfer, 
Krumpal, and Schmukle (2014, p. 19) define tax evasion as “an illegal act that violates 
the law and deviates from social norms that prescribe that taxes should be paid.” It can 
also be seen as “the wilful attempt to defeat or circumvent the tax law in order to 
illegally reduce one’s tax liability” (Gottschalk, 2010, p. 453).
To understand the phenomenon of tax evasion, a number of studies have been 
conducted. The earlier studies tended to be general, theoretical, experimental-based or 
setting the agenda for further research (for example, Allingham & Sandmo, 1972; 
Jackson & Milliron, 1986; Fischer, Wartick, & Mark, 1992; Andreoni, Erard, & 
Feinstein, 1998; Sandmo, 2005; Long & Swingen, 1991). In one of the earliest studies, 
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) provide a theoretical model of individuals’ decisions to 
evade income tax, under which the choice to evade tax is based on the outcome of a 
comparison between the detection risk and the gains achieved from evading the tax. 
More recently, the literature investigated the tax evasion phenomenon from different 
perspectives including its determinants (Riahi-Belkaoui, 2004; Richardson, 2006; Chau 
& Leung, 2009; Pickhardt & Prinz, 2014; Khlif & Achek, 2015), and the impact of 
culture (Tsakumis et al., 2007; Richardson, 2008; Réthi, 2012; Putnam, Abdelfattah, 
Bagchi, & Braun, 2016). The political perspective was investigated in a few studies 
(Feld & Tyran, 2002; Katz & Owen, 2013), as well as the behavioural perspective 
(Groenland & Van Veldhoven, 1983; Spicer & Hero, 1985; Wenzel, 2005; Torgler & 
Valev, 2010; Pickhardt & Prinz, 2014; Kaplanoglou & Rapanos, 2015; Casal, Kogler, 
Mittone, & Kirchler, 2016; Litina & Palivos, 2016), with a number adopting the 
Slippery Slope Framework, a tax compliance model that links tax payments to the level 
of trust in governments and the power of tax authorities (Kirchler, Hoelzl, & Wahl, 
2008; Wahl, Kastlunger, & Kirchler, 2010; Kastlunger, Lozza, Kirchler, & Schabmann, 
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2013). The framework implies a positive correlation between voluntary compliance and 
the level of trust in governments, whereas the power of tax authorities is positively 
correlated with enforced compliance.
A few studies have addressed the measurement of tax evasion (e.g., Alm, 2012; 
Korndörfer et al., 2014). Alm (2012) provides a detailed discussion of the various 
approaches to measure tax evasion and classifies them to traditional (such as audits of 
samples of tax returns and the size of shadow economies) and modern measures (such 
as conducting controlled field experiments and consumption-based measures). One 
interesting non-traditional approach is proposed by Henderson et al. (2012), which 
involves the use of satellites to measure luminosity from space as an estimate of real 
economic activity. Comparing this ‘real’ activity to official economic levels, tax 
evasion can be estimated as the difference. Alm’s (2012) discussion leads to the 
conclusion that there is no one superior method for measuring tax evasion, as every 
approach has its limitations.
This study utilises the size of the shadow economy as a proxy for tax evasion, as 
explained later in section 4.1. A shadow economy “includes all market-based legal 
production of goods and services that are deliberately concealed from public 
authorities” (Schneider, 2005, p. 4). The concealment could be for various reasons such 
as evading tax and/or avoiding other legal requirements related to labour minimum 
wages and working hours. The shadow economy size is frequently used in tax evasion 
studies (Alm, 2012). According to Alm (2012, p. 58), a shadow economy can be seen 
as the “gap between predicted level of economic activity and the official national 
accounts level …, which can then [be] used as a proxy for the amount of tax evasion.”
A body of the literature has examined the determinants of tax evasion (for example, 
Chau & Leung, 2009; Fischer et al., 1992; Khlif & Achek, 2015; Riahi-Belkaoui, 2004; 
Richardson, 2006, 2008; Tsakumis et al., 2007; Zoana, 2011). As noted earlier, much 
of the literature focused on economic factors and scholars called for more consideration 
of non-economic variables. Fischer’s et al. (1992) tax compliance model identified a 
number of economic and non-economic factors that affect the level of tax evasion. 
Economic factors include income level, income source, and occupation, whereas non-
economic ones include demographic variables, attitudes and perceptions towards the 
fairness of the tax system, and tax system complexity and structure. Chau and Leung 
(2009) added culture as a non-economic variable to Fischer’s model. 
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A number of studies have highlighted the importance of non-economic variables in tax 
evasion studies. Investigating the impact of tax morale on tax evasion in 30 countries, 
Riahi-Belkaoui (2004) found a positive link between tax compliance non-economic 
factors such as economic freedom, competition laws and low crime rates. Accordingly, 
he concluded that “a powerful deterrent to tax evasion is the creation of a tax morale or 
climate where citizens are guaranteed economic rights, and safe lives” (2004, p. 141) 
and called for “the need for a contingency theory of tax compliance that calls on not 
only economic determinants of tax compliance but also institutional and moral 
determinants” (2004, p. 141). 
Building on Riahi-Belkaoui’s (2004) study, Richardson (2006, p. 150) examined the 
determinants of tax evasion in 45 countries and concluded that “non-economic 
determinants have the strongest impact on tax evasion” compared to economic 
variables. Particularly, he found the complexity of the tax system and education to be 
among the most important determinants of tax evasion. In another study, Richardson 
(2008) examined the relationship between culture and tax evasion in 47 countries 
building on Tsakumis’ et al. (2007) model. Adding the rule of law, trust in government 
and religiosity as determinants of tax evasion to the model increased the explanatory 
power of Tsakumis’ et al. (2007) model. Accordingly, Richardson (2008) highlighted 
the importance of including non-economic variables in tax evasion studies, as they may 
lead to better understanding of the phenomenon and probably providing better insights 
for policy makers.
With the aim of extending the literature on the role of non-economic variables, this 
study investigates the impact of the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators, 
as a set of non-economic, institutional environment quality measures, on tax evasion in 
the EU. To achieve this objective, the study tests a number of hypotheses related to tax 
evasion in old versus new EU members states and the link between each of the six 
WGIs and tax evasion, as developed in the following section.
3 Hypotheses Development
3.1. Tax evasion in old versus new EU member states
The EU witnessed its biggest enlargement wave in 2004 with the accession of 10 
countries, followed by Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, for the union to reach 27 
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countries. It currently has 28 countries, with the accession of Croatia in July 2013.3 
Most of the new (post-2004) EU member states, with the exception of Cyprus and 
Malta, are in eastern and central Europe, including three countries that were part of the 
Soviet Union. To join the EU, a country must meet specific political, economic and 
administrative conditions, known as the Copenhagen criteria (EU, 2017). The accession 
of the new countries implies meeting the criteria; however, dissimilarities may still exist 
among the member states, including levels of tax compliance.
There is little evidence in the literature on the level of tax evasion in eastern European 
countries, and it suggests low tax compliance in a number of the new EU member states. 
For example, Alon and Hageman (2013) investigated the impact of corruption on firm 
tax compliance in 22 former Soviet economies and found evidence of high corruption 
levels and low tax compliance. It is not expected that the accession of these countries 
to the EU will result in an imminent change in the ‘level of corruption’ or any of the 
other WGIs. However, the old EU member states have been subject to many directives 
and regulations, covering economic, social and political aspects, for decades, and it is 
normal to expect a relatively high degree of harmonisation among these countries 
compared to the new EU member states. There is evidence from the literature of high 
tax compliance in some of the old EU member states (Alm & Torgler, 2006). 
Nevertheless, no previous studies have directly compared the level of tax evasion in the 
sets of member states comprising the EU. Thus, the first hypothesis is:
H1: There is a significant difference in the level of tax evasion between old (EU1) and 
new (EU2) member states.
3.2. Institutional Quality Environment and Tax Evasion
The link between public governance and economic development has ignited the 
interests of policymakers and scholars to look for a suitable measure of governance 
quality at country-level (Thomas, 2010). A number of indicators have been suggested, 
but the World Bank-backed Worldwide Governance Indicators developed by 
Kaufmann et al. (2011) is “[one] of the most well-known and comprehensive studies of 
3 Accordingly, Croatia is not included in this study due to the lack of enough data after joining the EU.
9
the institutional environment of countries” (Daniel, Cieslewicz, & Pourjalali, 2012, p. 
373). 
Public governance could be defined as “the traditions and institutions by which 
authority in a country is exercised (Kaufmann et al., 2011, p. 222). Kaufmann et al. 
(2011, p. 223) propose the six governance indicators shown in Table 1. The six 
measures have been calculated for 215 countries since 1996 as part of a long-term 
project commissioned by the World Bank.4 The reliability and validity of these 
indicators have been tested by academics and policy makers (Daniel et al., 2012). The 
links between tax evasion and each of the six indicators are presented in the rest of this 
section.
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
3.2.1. Voice and accountability (VA)
A number of studies investigated the impact of the voting process on tax compliance 
(for example, Alm, McClelland, & Schulze, 1999; Feld & Tyran, 2002; Wahl et al., 
2010), and reported consistent results suggesting that engagement in the voting process 
is positively associated with tax compliance in society. In addition, Walker, Gardner, 
Herr and Ostrom (2000) found that participation and voting can increase cooperation 
and the efficiency of operations. Accordingly, the second hypothesis is:
H2: The higher the level of voice and accountability (VA), the lower the level of tax 
evasion.
3.2.2. Political stability
Evidence from prior research suggests a positive link between tax morale and 
established democratic traditions (e.g., Alm & Torgler, 2006). Riahi-Belkaoui (2004, 
p. 141) advocates that a good “deterrent to tax evasion is the creation of a tax morale.” 
Accordingly, this evidence suggests that political stability should lead to high tax 
morale and in turn to lower tax evasion. Political uncertainties faced by taxpayers can 
be classified into two types; not knowing which political party will be in control, and 
not knowing whether they would be caught for evading taxes by a new government 
4 The data needed to calculate these measures have been extracted from 31 data sources including 
households, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the public sector, and commercial firms 
(Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2011).
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(Katz & Owen, 2013). Based on their perceptions of these political uncertainties, 
taxpayers may attempt to protect their wealth by hiding their real incomes and 
accordingly evading tax.
Investigating the relationship between democracy and crime, Cuesta (2013) provides a 
review of a number of theories. The civilisation theory, for instance, predicts lower 
crime rates as democratic systems become more established, i.e., having higher political 
stability (LaFree & Tseloni, 2006). As a crime, tax evasion is expected to decline as 
political stability increases. Thus, the third hypothesis is:
H3: The higher the level of political stability (PS), the lower the level of tax evasion.
3.2.3. Government effectiveness
According to Allingham and Sandmo’s (1972) theoretical model, concealment of 
income depends on the taxpayer’ evaluation of the expected utility of the income. It 
also depends on the efficient allocation of resources by the government. This reflects 
the government effectiveness, which, in turn, affects taxpayers’ satisfaction. It can be 
argued that government effectiveness contributes to forming taxpayers’ perception 
regarding the expected utility of their tax payments. Torgler and Schneider  (2009, p. 
229) advocate that “better institutions provide stronger incentives to behave legally and 
increase the costs of illegal activities as a consequence of greater institutional 
accountability.” Accordingly, if taxpayers perceive governments to be efficient rather 
than wasteful, it is likely they will comply with tax laws. Hence, the fourth hypothesis 
is:
H4: The higher the level of government effectiveness (GE), the lower the level of tax 
evasion.
3.2.4. Regulatory quality
Regulations that permit and promote the private sector help in creating a suitable 
environment to foster a respectful relationship between the government and taxpayers. 
This will reduce the hostile and antagonistic interactions that can positively affect tax 
compliance levels (Hofmann, Gangl, Kirchler, & Stark, 2014). The simplification of 
tax systems leads to higher tax compliance (Awasthi & Bayraktar, 2014; Richardson, 
2006). In other words, high regulatory quality should lead to more tax compliance. 
Thus, the fifth hypothesis is:
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H5: The higher the level of regulatory quality (RQ), the lower the level of tax evasion.
3.2.5. Rule of law
It is argued that the level of tax evasion is subject to a number of factors including trust 
in authority and the deterrence power of the tax authority (Wahl et al., 2010). Kirchler 
et al. (2008) differentiate between two types of societies, antagonistic and synergistic 
climates. In antagonistic climates, a culture of ‘cops and robbers’ prevails, whereas 
synergistic climates are characterised as having a ‘service and client’ culture. Taxpayers 
are likely to voluntarily comply under the latter. Kirchler et al. (2008, p. 212) advocate 
that “tax compliance can be achieved through increasing levels of power and trust.” 
Perceiving the government as legitimate persuades individuals within a society to be 
committed to follow its rules (Tyler, 2006). Hence, the sixth hypothesis is:
H6: The higher the level of rule of law (RL), the lower the level of tax evasion.
3.2.6. Control of corruption
According to Friedman et al. (2000, p. 460), “greater corruption, and a weaker legal 
environment are all associated with a larger unofficial economy.” In addition, Alon and 
Hageman’s (2013) study of 5,000 firms operating in 22 former Soviet countries found 
evidence of lower tax compliance under a high level of corruption. It can be argued that 
corruption can incentivise individuals and businesses to evade paying taxes as well as 
to facilitate it through public officials. Thus, the seventh hypothesis is:




As a proxy of tax evasion, the size of the shadow economy was obtained for each of 
the 27 countries for the period between 2004 and 2014 from Schneider et al. (2015). 
The size of the shadow economy can be estimated at the micro or the macro levels 
(Schneider & Buehn, 2012). Measured at the microeconomics level, it is based on 
surveys or questionnaires or other indirect means such as the demand for currency. At 
the macroeconomics level, the measurement is based on a number of factors including 
the level of employment, the tax burden and the degree of regulation. This study is 
based on the MIMIC model (Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes): a macroeconomic 
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measure of the shadow economy. The MIMIC model considers different indicators that 
directly affect the development of shadow economies’ sizes over time. Schneider et al. 
(2012, p. 9) claim that “there can be no exact measure of the size of the shadow 
economy” as estimates can suffer a 15% error margin, but stress the superiority of the 
MIMIC as a measure of the shadow economy.
The six WGIs explained in Table 1, are published by the World Bank as measures of 
IEQ, ranging between (-2.5) to (+2.5) (World Bank, 2016). As a sign of their reliability, 
in addition to being published by the World Bank, the WGIs are perceived as a reliable 
measure of IEQ, as they are frequently used by governments in countries such as the 
US when allocating grants worth millions of dollars to foreign countries (Thomas, 
2010).
4.2. Control variables
Due to the nature of this study, being a cross-country study, a number of variables are 
included to control for the social and economic differences between the countries. A 
number of studies found a negative relationship between the education level and tax 
evasion (Richardson, 2006; Wallschutzky, 1984; Witte & Woodbury, 1985). 
Taxpayers’ positive perception of taxation increases with the level of education, hence 
leading to higher tax compliance (Jackson & Milliron, 1986). Accordingly, to control 
for differences in the level of education and knowledge among the 27 EU member 
states, the Human Development Index (HDI), developed by the United Nations 
Development Programme, is included in the model.5 To control for economic 
differences, two control variables are included in the model: unemployment rates 
(UNEM) and agriculture (AGR) as a percentage of the GDP.6 The higher the 
unemployment rate, the higher the expected level of tax evasion (Torgler & Schneider, 
2009). As a source of income, agriculture has been found to be a factor linked to higher 
levels of tax evasion compared to other sources of income (Wallschutzky, 1984).
5 Available on the UNDP’s website: http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi 
6 Available on the World Bank’s website: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ 
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4.3. Linear mixed model (LMM)
Although widely utilised, Ordinary Least-Squares models (OLS) have been criticised 
for being unfit for panel data analysis for  violating basic assumptions, such as the 
independence of observations assumption (Hox, 2010). In cross-country studies, 
observations may not be independent, as the data, for the same country, could be 
duplicated leading to within-cluster (country) correlation. Furthermore, disregarding 
the data clustered structure could lead to biased estimates of standard errors and 
potentially higher Type I error (Hox, 2010; Shek & Ma, 2011). Accordingly, linear 
mixed models (LMM) have been suggested as a suitable solution for modelling panel 
data, as LMM facilitates tracking variables (such as the size of tax evasion) over time 
for differences cases (countries) without disregarding the effect of other time-invariant 
variables (Laird & Ware, 1982). 
A number of studies have indicated the superiority of LMM to OLS models, as the 
former produces error terms to control for the correlations resulting from the nature of 
the data clusters (countries), as described above (Field, 2013; Kreft, 1996; Morris, 
1995; Mundfrom & Schultz, 2002; Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002; Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2007). Furthermore, LMM could be seen as a generalisation of OLS, as it deals better 
with continuous variables leading to enhanced randomised effect designs, leading to 
more accurate estimates of error terms and lower Type I errors  (Newman, Newman, & 
Salzman, 2010; Shek & Ma, 2011). 
To measure the impact of institutional quality on tax evasion and whether there are any 
differences between the levels of tax evasion between EU1 and EU2, the following 
general form of the mixed effects model is proposed:
TEij
=







+ β4PS + β5GE + β6RQ + β7
RL + β8CC + β9VA + β10EU + β11CTRLi + εij
Where:  is the tax evasion for country  at time ,  is the mean tax evasion, and TEi i j βoo
 is the country deviation from this mean, . Similarly,  is the mean b0i (b0i~N(0,σ20) β1
growth/decline rate in TE and  is the country deviation from this mean b1i (b1i~N
.  are independent random errors for each country  and time , . (0,σ21) ϵij i j ϵij~N(0,σ2ε)
VA (voice and accountability), PS (political stability), GE government effectiveness), 
14
RQ (regulatory quality), RL (rule of law), CoC (control of corruption), and EU 
(indicator variable: 0 = old (EU1) and 1 = new (EU2) member states) are the covariates, 
which were included in the model to evaluate their effect on TE.  represents β11CTRLi
the control variables included in the model.
The model also included the higher-order polynomial trends (i.e., quadratic) , and (β2)
cubic slope ( ) to test a nonlinear growth trajectory across time and improve model β3
goodness of fit.
4.4. Robustness of the model
Linear and curvilinear models with higher order polynomials (quadratic and cubic 
terms) have been incorporated into the model to track all details of changes in tax 
evasion over time. These models test whether the rate of change of tax evasion 
accelerated or decelerated across time using several variance covariance structures of 
the error term. LMM allows treating the intercept and linear slope as fixed or random 
across countries. Under the random coefficients modelling framework, the proposed 
model was progressively built with explanatory variables accommodating for different 
variance covariance structures.
As the true error structure is usually unknown, a comparison criterion is necessary to 
compare between models with different variance covariance structure (Jennrich & 
Schluchter, 1986). A backward stepwise procedure was adopted to select which 
variables and their interactions should remain in the final model. Starting from a full 
model incorporating all fixed (with interaction between covariates) and random effects, 
decisions as to which variables to retain in the final model and the best variance 
covariance structure were based on comparisons of the differences in the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) given by , as assessed by a ( - 2 log likelihood + 2k)
chi-square test  (Akaike, 1974). AIC measures the relative fit of competing (p < 0.05)
models with different covariance patterns, where  is the number of covariance k
parameters. This method sought to identify the ‘best’ subset of predictors while 
simultaneously removing those variables that are redundant (Hegyi & Garamszegi, 
2011). The final model fit, using Restricted Maximum Likelihood (REML) estimation, 




Tables 2 and 3 present descriptive statistics for the variables included in this study for 
the 27 EU member states as one bloc and broken down to old (EU1) and new (EU2) 
sub-groups. As illustrated in Table 2, the overall average of tax evasion for both groups 
(EU1 and EU2) is 19.5 (SD=6.98). The TE average for EU2 is higher than EU1 with 
25.27 versus 15.10. Country-based analysis (Table 3) reveals that TE averages range 
between 8.7 (SD =1.19) for Austria (from EU1) to 32.0 (SD =0.64) for Bulgaria (from 
EU2). Almost all EU2 countries’ TE averages are higher than 23 except for the Czech 
Republic (16.9, SD =1.21) and Slovakia (16.4, SD =1.10). However, EU1 countries’ 
TE averages range between 8.7 for Austria (SD =1.19) to 22.3 (SD =1.42) and 25.2 (SD 
=1.57) for Italy and Greece, respectively. Table 2 presents a summary of the six WGIs 
and control variables. The results reveal that all EU1 countries have higher averages for 
all WGIs compared to EU2 countries. Further analysis reveals consistent patterns of 
change in the means of all six WGIs over the analysis period between EU1 and EU2.
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
Table 3 indicates that Greece has the highest mean of tax evasion in EU1 and that Italy, 
Portugal and Spain are above the entire EU overall average of 19.5. Indeed, these 
countries have been experiencing some sort of financial and economic issues in recent 
years. Except for the Czech Republic and Slovakia, all EU2 countries are above the 
overall TE average of 19.5. This suggests that tax evasion is a more fundamental 
problem in EU2 compared to EU1.
Table 4 reports the Pearson pairwise correlation coefficients between the variables. The 
results reveal that all WGIs are negatively and significantly correlated with TE. Thus, 
this implies that the higher the WGIs the lower the level of tax evasion. The results also 
reveal that WGIs are also highly and significantly correlated with each other, which 
implies that they support one another. In other words, IEQ emerges as a combination 
of these attributes. In technical terms, such high correlations among variables may 
cause multicollinearity in the regression analysis, but this issue is addressed by 
monitoring VIF values and using stepwise regression analysis (see Appendix A, and 
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Tables 6 & 7). According to the VIF values, multicollinearity is not an issue for the 
analyses.
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE
5.2. Main Findings
Table 5 presents the results of examining TE levels in the EU, as one bloc (Full Model), 
and broken down into groups, old (EU1) and new (EU2) member states. The objective 
is to determine whether there is a significant difference in the level of tax evasion 
between the two groups. Three control variables (AGR, UNEM and HDI) have been 
added to the models. The Full Model indicates that HDI is significant (-21.06, P<0.01) 
and negatively related to TE, and UNEM is significant (0.087, P<0.001). HDI is 
significant (-27.28, P<0.01) in the EU2 Model but not in the EU1 Model. This suggests 
that the level of education and knowledge in EU2, the new member states, is a 
contributing factor to tax evasion. UNEM is significant in both EU1 (0.103, P<0.001) 
and EU2 (0.061, P<0.001), with a higher coefficient in EU1 compared to EU2. This 
suggests a higher impact of unemployment on the level of TE in the old compared to 
the new member states.
The rest of this section provides a detailed discussion of the results, as presented in 
Table 5, addressing the three research questions of the study.
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE
5.2.1. Tax Evasion in EU1 Versus EU2
The results in Table 5 indicate that the intercept in EU1 countries (26.49%, p<0.01) is 
lower than its equivalent in EU2 (49.31%, p<0.001). This indicates that the average of 
tax evasion in EU2 is higher than EU1 since the start of the analysis period in 2004. The 
Full Model indicates that EU as an indicator variable is highly significant at (p<0.001); 
implying a significant difference between EU1 and EU2. Thus, the empirical results give 
support to H1. These results are not directly comparable to previous research, as this is 
the first study that compares TE levels in old versus new EU member states. However, 
it is consistent with Alon and Hageman’s (2013) findings of high corruption level and 
low tax compliance in former Soviet economies. It is also consistent with Alm and 
Torgler’s (2006) evidence of high tax compliance in a number of western European 
countries.
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5.2.2. Institutional environment quality impact on tax evasion
With regard to the link between IEQ and TE, four WGIs are significant in the Full 
Model (CoC, GE, RQ and VA). CoC (-0.46) and RQ (-0.54) were significant at (p<0.1) 
and negatively related to TE (see Table 5). This indicates that regulatory quality and 
control of corruption are negatively related to TE, which is consistent with prior studies 
(Awasthi & Bayraktar, 2014; Hofmann et al., 2014). The other two WGIs, VA and GE, 
are significantly related to TE (p<0.05); both are positively related to TE (VA 0.88; GE 
0.59). This, rather unexpected, positive association is probably due to the presence of a 
suppressor variable. Further tests were conducted that provide evidence that VA and 
GE are negatively associated with TE (see Appendix A, Table 6). Thus, the results lend 
support to H2, H4, H5, and H7 and fail to lend support for the other hypotheses (H3, and 
H6).
These findings are consistent with previous research regarding the positive link 
between participating in the voting process on tax issues (reflecting high VA) and tax 
compliance (e.g., Alm et al., 1999; Feld & Tyran, 2002). The findings are also 
consistent with Allingham and Sandmo’s (1972) prediction that better institutions and 
the efficient allocation of resources by the government (reflecting its effectiveness, GE) 
provide stronger incentives for taxpayers to be tax compliant. Additionally, the results 
confirm Torgler and Schneider’s (2009) findings of a negative association between 
control of corruption, as well as regulatory quality, and TE. In addition, the findings 
lend support to evidence reported in previous research on the link between the 
complexity of the tax system and the level of tax compliance (e.g., Awasthi & 
Bayraktar, 2014; Richardson, 2006).
With regard to old member states, the EU1 Model shows that GE and VA are positively 
associated with TE (GE 1.09, p<0.001; VA 0.89, p<0.1); both are subject to the 
suppressor effect (see Appendix A, Table 7). CoC (-0.463, p<0.1), RQ (-0.97, p<0.01), 
and PS (-0.44, p<0.1) are negatively related to TE in EU1. In the EU2 Model, only GE 
is significant and negatively related to TE (-0.555, p<0.1). These results indicate that 
there are different significant WGIs in EU1 compared to EU2, accordingly providing 
evidence of differences in institutional environment quality between the two groups of 
member states contributing to the observed difference in the level of tax evasion, as 
discussed in section 5.2.1.
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5.2.3. Tax Evasion: Time Analysis 
To trace tax evasion behaviour over time, three time variables (linear, quadratic, and 
cubic) were added to the model, as explained in section 4.3. The linear and quadratic 
time variables, in Table 5, are highly significant in the Full Model (p<0.001). This 
indicates that TE behaviour is not linear (constant) over time. The negative effect of 
linear growth (β= -15.17) suggests that TE decreased at the beginning of analysis period 
(since 2004) at an average of 15.17% each year in the EU. The positive effect of the 
quadratic term of time (β= 2.13) indicates a deceleration in the TE declining rate in the 
EU.
In addition, the random intercept and slope terms of the Full Model are significant, with 
a standard deviation of 4.75 and 0.087, respectively. This indicates that the initial level 
of TE and the deceleration rate of TE are different at country-level, which is likely due 
to the varying IEQ of each country.
The results in Table 5 also reveal that the initial tax evasion levels in EU1 member states 
are significantly different (random intercept, 4.84) as well as the deceleration rate in 
TE over time (random slope, 0.11). Similar observations can be made for EU2 regarding 
the random intercept (4.39) and random slope (0.079). Similar to the Full Model, the 
initial level and the declining rate of TE in EU1 and EU2 member states are different at 
country-level. However, the standard deviation for EU1 slopes is higher than the 
standard deviation of EU2 slopes (0.11 versus 0.079, respectively), which means that 
the variation in deceleration rate in EU1 is higher than EU2. This is probably due to the 
within-group differences in TE levels in EU1, i.e., countries with an average TE of more 
than 19.5 such as Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal (mainly southern European), and 
countries with an average TE below 19.5 such as Germany and France (northern 
European).
The time coefficients, in Table 5, are significant for both EU1 and EU2 (-12.96, p<0.001 
and -0.228, p<0.001, respectively). However, the quadratic term of time is significant 
for EU1 (2.41, p<0.001) but not for EU2. This implies that the TE deceleration 
behaviour in EU2 is linear, while it is quadratic in EU1; meaning that the deceleration 
rate in EU2 is faster than its equivalent in EU1. This difference in tax evasion behaviour 
over time between EU1 and EU2, and even within each group, as discussed above, is a 
noteworthy observation that should be considered by policymakers.
19
6 Implications and Conclusion
This study aims at investigating the impact of institutional environment quality (IEQ) 
on tax evasion in the EU during the period 2004-2014. A comparative analysis is 
undertaken between old, pre-2004 (EU1) and new, post-2004 (EU2) member states. The 
three main research questions of the study focused on the difference in tax evasion 
levels between EU1 and EU2, the impact of IEQ of tax evasion in the EU, and tax 
evasion behaviour over the analysis period. This section summarises the main findings 
and highlights a number of implications for policymakers and researchers. It also 
presents the study limitations and opportunities for further research.
The results reveal that there is a difference in tax evasion levels between the old and 
new member states. Compared to old members, new members have significantly higher 
levels of tax evasion. Furthermore, there is evidence of a difference in the tax evasion 
behaviour during the period under investigation, as the declining rate of tax evasion in 
the new member states is faster than its equivalent in the old ones. Another finding of 
this study is the revelation that the accession of the new members to the EU has resulted 
in an improvement in their institutional environment quality in a number of these 
countries. However, institutional environment quality levels are found to be higher in 
the old compared to the new member states. This seems to have an impact on tax 
evasion levels, as more indicators of institutional environment quality are found to be 
significant in the old member states. Five indicators are found to be significant in the 
old member states compared to only one in the new ones. 
The findings of this study have a number of implications for policymakers and 
researchers. First, the evidence of a significant difference between tax evasion levels in 
the old and new member states is an issue that should be paid more attention to by EU 
officials. This study examines the impact of the institutional environment quality, but 
other factors reported in the literature exist. A holistic approach should be adopted to 
consider the evidence reported in this study as well as reported in previous research to 
tackle tax evasion more effectively, particularly in the new member states.
Second, the revelation that only one WGI, government effectiveness, is significant with 
regard to tax evasion in the new member states is a reason for concern. Although there 
has been an improvement in the level of institutional environment quality in some of 
the new member states since 2004, this improvement did not reflect positively on the 
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level of tax evasion in the group, as it did in the older member states. EU officials need 
to enhance the five other areas mainly in the new member states in order to have more 
consistency across the union.
Third, efforts to enhance institutional environment quality should not focus on the new 
member states only. The evidence shows differences within the old member states as a 
group. For example, Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal have above average levels of 
tax evasion. Fourth, another difference between old and new members that is 
noteworthy of EU officials’ attention is related the education and knowledge level, 
which is revealed as a significant contributing factor to tax evasion in the new member 
states, but not the old ones. 
Finally, one implication for researchers is the utilisation of a linear mixed model 
(LMM) to examine the determinants of tax evasion in cross-country studies. Using 
LMM to model panel data allows tracking tax evasion over time for different countries 
(treated as random effects in the model) while considering the impact of other time-
invariant variables in the model.
To summarise, this is the first study that comparatively investigates the impact of IEQ 
on tax evasion levels in old and new EU member states taking the changing level of tax 
evasion over time into consideration. The study makes a number of contributions to the 
literature on tax evasion. First, it provides evidence on the impact of non-economic 
variables, IEQ measured by the World Bank’s WGIs, on tax evasion. Evidence from 
prior research suggests that non-economic variables seem to have a strong impact on 
tax evasion and calls have been made for more consideration of such variables. Second, 
the adoption of a linear mixed model to examine how IEQ affects tax evasion is another 
contribution that distinguishes this study from prior work, as described above.
Third, not only does the current study extend the literature on the impact of non-
economic variables on tax evasion, but it also examines the impact in a unique context 
comparing old and new EU member states. Studying the phenomenon of tax evasion in 
the EU is unique due to the composition of the union. Meeting the Copenhagen Criteria 
does not warrant complete similarity in economic and social conditions but leads to 
fewer differences among the countries. This is a crucial factor when comparing the 
context adopted in the current study to previous cross-country studies that examined 
tax evasion in countries with no common backgrounds. Accordingly, the investigation 
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in such comparative context should fine-tune our understanding of how IEQ influences 
TE and provide policymakers with evidence on the need to operationalise specific IEQ 
factors for more effective control of tax evasion.
The results of this study are subject to a number of limitations. First, the results should 
be interpreted subject to the World Bank’s WGIs limitations signalled by Thomas 
(2010) regarding the indicators’ large standard errors and their ‘construct validity’, i.e., 
whether the indicators really measure and reflect the level of governance at country-
level. However, these indicators are considered “[one] of the most well-known and 
comprehensive studies of the institutional environment of countries” (Daniel et al., 
2012, p. 373). Second, the use of shadow economies is a proxy for measuring the size 
of tax evasion. However, as Alm (2012) advocates, each approach for estimating tax 
evasion has its own limitation. The study attempted to minimise the impact of this 
limitation by using the MIMIC model, as described in section 4.1.
Opportunities for future research may include replicating this study in other 
jurisdictions or utilising other measures of institutional environment quality. In 
addition, a number of studies have examined the impact of culture on tax evasion but 
did not address the mechanism through which this influence occurs. Could institutional 
environment quality be this mechanism? Could enhancing specific aspects of the 
institutional environment be a factor in minimising the impact of culture on tax 
evasion? Perhaps this could be investigated in future research.
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Table 1. Definitions of Worldwide Governance Indicators (GIs) and Control Variables
Measure Definition
Voice & accountability (VA)
“Capturing perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, and a free media”
Political stability (PS)
“Capturing perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including 
politically-motivated violence and terrorism.”
Government effectiveness 
(GE)
“Capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the 
civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the 
quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the 
government’s commitment to such policies.”
Regulatory quality (RQ)
“Capturing perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private 
sector development.”
Rule of law (RL)
“Capturing perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence.”
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   















Control of corruption (CoC)
“Capturing perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests.”
Agriculture (AGR)
The value added of agriculture as a percentage of GDP
Unemployment (UNEM) Unemployment as a percentage of total labor force
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   










Human Development index 
(HDI)
A composite index measuring average achievement in three basic dimensions 
of human development, healthy life, Education and a decent standard of 
living. Used as a proxy for education.
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All EU1 EU2 All EU1 EU2 All EU1 EU2
Min Max
TE 291 19.50* 15.10 25.27 19.10 14.20 26.00 6.98 4.93 4.69 7.50 32.70
HDI 297 0.86 0.88 0.82 0.86 0.89 0.82 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.75 0.93
UNEM 297 8.82 8.49 9.23 7.73 7.65 7.89 4.21 4.58 3.68 2.75 27.47
AGR 297 2.60 1.70 3.72 2.27 1.62 3.50 1.72 0.90 1.84 0.27 13.98
CoC 297 1.05 1.53 0.44 1.00 1.66 0.33 0.81 0.71 0.43 -0.30 2.55
GE 297 1.16 1.50 0.75 1.14 1.59 0.83 0.61 0.51 0.44 -0.36 2.36
PS 297 0.76 0.81 0.69 0.79 0.91 0.72 0.41 0.46 0.33 -0.47 1.59
RQ 297 1.24 1.43 1.00 1.21 1.55 1.03 0.40 0.38 0.28 0.16 1.92
RL 297 1.15 1.49 0.72 1.13 1.69 0.79 0.60 0.48 0.44 -0.18 2.12
VA 297 1.15 1.36 0.89 1.11 1.39 0.96 0.33 0.25 0.23 0.29 1.83
* Average Tax evasion in the EU
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Tax Evasion by Country
Country N Mean SD Min. Max.
PANEL A (EU1)
Austria 11 8.7 1.19 7.5 11
Belgium 11 17.9 1.49 16.1 20.7
Denmark 11 14.5 1.38 12.8 17.1
Finland 11 14.4 1.41 12.9 17.2
France 11 11.7 1.33 9.9 14.3
Germany 11 14.3 0.97 13.0 16.1
Greece 11 25.2 1.57 23.3 28.1
Ireland 11 13.1 1.05 11.8 15.2
Italy 11 22.3 1.42 20.8 25.2
Luxembourg 11 8.8 0.78 8.0 10
Netherlands 11 10.3 1.11 9.1 12.5
Portugal 11 19.6 0.98 18.7 21.7
Spain 11 19.6 1.13 18.4 21.9
Sweden 11 15.4 1.41 13.6 18.1
United Kingdom 11 10.7 0.86 9.6 12.3
PANEL B (EU2)
Bulgaria 8 32.0 0.64 31.0 32.7
Cyprus 11 26.5 1.07 25.2 28.3
Czech Republic 11 16.9 1.21 15.3 19.1
Estonia 11 29.0 1.10 27.1 30.8
Hungary 11 23.3 1.01 21.6 24.7
Latvia 11 27.2 1.67 24.7 30.0
Lithuania 11 29.5 1.35 27.1 31.7
Malta 11 25.9 0.87 24.3 27.2
Poland 11 25.5 1.29 23.5 27.4
Romania 8 29.3 0.70 28.1 30.2
Slovakia 11 16.4 1.10 14.6 18.2
Slovenia 11 24.6 1.10 23.1 26.5
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Table 4. Correlation Matrix between Variables
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. Tax Evasion (TE) 
2. Control of Corruption (CC) -0.74
3. Government Effectiveness 
(GE) -0.73 0.94
4. Political Stability (PS) -0.44 0.56 0.59
5. Regulatory Quality (RQ) -0.70 0.89 0.89 0.57
6. Rule of Law (RL) -0.76 0.95 0.95 0.61 0.90
7. Voice and Accountability 
(VA) -0.75 0.93 0.93 0.62 0.88 0.93
8.Human Development Index 
(HDI) -0.77 0.76 0.76 0.38 0.71 0.80 0.77
9. Unemployment (UNEM) 0.25 -0.39 -0.32 -0.45 -0.42 -0.36 -0.38 -0.21
10. Agriculture (AGR) 0.73 -0.69 -0.74 -0.46 -0.67 -0.77 -0.76 -0.79 0.23
All pairwise correlations are significant at the level of α = 0.001
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Table 5. Linear-Mixed Model Results
Independent Variables
Fixed Effects        Full Model EU1 – Model 
Old Countries 
EU2 – Model 
New Countries 
Intercept 32.07 (6.08) **** 26.49 (8.26) *** 49.31 (6.08) ****
Time (Year) -15.17 (1.79) **** -12.96 (1.86) **** -0.228 (0.044) ****
Time – Quadratic 2.13 (0.53) **** 2.41 (0.54) **** NS
HDI -21.06(6.82) *** NS -27.28(8.42) ***
UNEM        0.087 (0.014) **** 0.103 (0.019) **** 0.061 (0.016) ****
CoC -0.46 (0.24) * -0.463 (0.275) * NS
GE 0.59 (0.24) ** 1.09 (0.302) **** -0.555 (0.311) *
RQ -0.54 (0.288) * -0.97 (0.329) *** NS
VA 0.88 (0.413) ** 0.89 (0.509) * NS
PS NS -0.44 (0.244) * NS
EU 9.88 (1.52) **** NA NA
Random Components Standard deviation
Intercept 4.75**** 4.84**** 4.39****
Slope 0.087**** 0.11**** 0.079****
Residuals 0.397 0.379 0.327
AIC 414.63 220.72 166.86
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01, ****p<0.001, NA: Not applicable; NS: Not-significant and excluded from the 
model. Values in parentheses are Standard errors of the estimates. Full Model: all EU member states; Model-EU1: 
countries joined the EU before 2004; Model-EU2: countries joined the EU after 2004.
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Appendix (A)
As referred in section 5.2.2, VA and GE are found to be positively associated with TE 
(as indicated in Table 5). This could be explained by the existence of a suppressor 
variable. This problem occurs when the sign of the correlation coefficient between the 
dependent variable and a predictor (TE and GE, for example) does not match the sign 
of the coefficient in the regression model as the case in this study. Despite the negative 
sign of the correlation between TE and GE in Table 4, the signs of the observed 
coefficient for VA and GE in the Full Model (see Table 5) are positive. There is a strong 
evidence of suppression effect with the results of the multiple regression indicating that 
VA and GE are effectively reducing TE levels. This issue has been investigated further 
for the models that contain VA and GE effects to make sure that the signs of VA and 
GE coefficients and the correlations (see Table 4) are the same. A further examination 
was conducted to test the effect of all WGIs (see Table 5) and then the individual effect 
of each WGI using simple linear regression (Tables 6 and 7). This provides evidence 
that VA and GE are negatively associated with TE.
Table 6. Full Model and Individual Regression Models of Significant GI Factors for both 
Groups (EU1 and EU2)
Full Model
(Both EU1 & EU2)
VIF
Simple linear 
regression- Model 1 
GE
Simple linear 
regression- Model 2 
VA
Intercept 32.07 (6.08) ****
Time (Year) -15.17 (1.79) **** 2.83
Time – Quadratic 2.13 (0.53) **** 1.17
HDI -21.06(6.82) *** 2.72
UNEM 0.087 (0.014) ** 1.31
CoC -0.46 (0.24) * 1.22
GE 0.59 (0.24) ** 1.25 -8.95 (0.464) ****
RQ -0.54 (0.288) * 1.31
VA 0.88 (0.413) ** 1.33 -17.18 (0.791) ****
EU 9.88 (1.52) **** 1.05
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01, ****p<0.001, NA: Not applicable; NS: Not-significant
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Table 7. EU1 Model and Individual Regression Models of Significant GI Factors
Full Model
(Both EU1 & EU2)
VIF
Simple linear 
regression- Model 1 
GE
Simple linear 
regression- Model 2 
VA
Intercept 26.49 (8.26) **
Time (Year) -12.96 (1.86) **** 2.09
Time – Quadratic 2.41 (0.54) **** 1.33
HDI -14.34 (9.25) *** 2.03
UNEM 0.103 (0.019) **** 1.42
CoC -0.463 (0.275) * 1.27
GE 1.09 (0.302) **** 1.45 -6.82 (0.52)****
RQ -0.97 (0.329) *** 1.42
VA 0.89 (0.509) * 1.50 -14.59 (1.09)****
PS -0.44 (0.244) * 1.2
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01, ****p<0.001, NA: Not applicable; NS: Not-significant
